Freedom of Religion--The Dynamics of Separation by Boyd, James G.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 21 Issue 3 Article 5 
1969 
Freedom of Religion--The Dynamics of Separation 
James G. Boyd 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Boyd, James G. (1969) "Freedom of Religion--The Dynamics of Separation," South Carolina Law Review: 
Vol. 21 : Iss. 3 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss3/5 
This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
NOTES
FREEDOM OF RELIGION-THE DYNAMICS
OF SEPARATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The conduct of a citizen is measured by adherence to secular
ethics, and only to the extent that it corresponds to religious
tenets is spiritual behavior deemed a characteristic of member-
ship in the state. Separatists conceive an inviolable wall existing
between governmental and sectarian authority. This would seem-
ingly reduce any question of church-state relations to a mechan-
ical approach of whether or not the wall has been breached.
Thomas Jefferson's conclusion that there exists "a wall of separa-
tion"' assimilated into the first amendment, is, however, only a
graphic metaphor that has camouflaged the complexities of the
relationship of law to religion in a democratic society dominated
by a religious majority.
The theory of the United States Constitution may be stated
as a reconciliation of democratic rule and certain basic indivi-
dual rights. The Bill of Rights comprehends a group of human
values which are made impervious to the majority will on the
assumption that men inately possess certain rights which exist
independently of the State.2 At the same time if one accepts the
proposition that the will of the majority predominates one
must also agree that the first amendment cannot in fact be
absolute, and that there exists an area of competency within
which the state can act. This would then reduce the theory of an
inviolable wall of separation to spectral quality. An initial in-
1. S. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (1943).
2. Man inately possesses natural rights that exist independent of civil
authority. Before man may establish civil authority he must submit such
natural rights as are necessary to form the bonds of society. However, there
do exist such natural rights that man has not submitted; neither could he if
he is to exist as a free individual, one being freedom of conscience. But while
opinion and belief have not been submitted and are in fact absolute, conduct
cannot be absolute if society is to protect itself from dissolution. See Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). As was said by Jefferson: "[O]ur
rulers can have authority over such natural rights, only as we have submitted
to them. The rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not submit.
We are answerable for them to our God." C. PATTERSON, THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 182 (1953).
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quiry into the history surrounding the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, in particular the first amendment, clearly shows, how-
ever, that there exists a realm within which the majority may
not subordinate individual liberties to the will of the populace.
Thus, the first amendment conspicuously begins with the nega-
tion of any government action to establish religion or to infringe
upon the free exercise of religious conscience.
Jefferson's conclusion that the language of the religion clauses
created a wall of separation is supportable by the recognition
that there can be no established state church. However, aside
from this limitation and that on freedom of conscience,3 the
inviolable wall becomes a pragmatic fiction, without a foundation
in the area in which the values of church and state overlap and
intermingle.
It is the purpose of this article to examine "the wall" in the
context of a larger discussion centered on the rights of the
minority in a democratic society and the conflict between spirit-
ual ethic and secular enactments. While the subtleties of con-
stitutional and institutional problems are beyond the scope of
this article, it is hoped that by elaborating upon the problems
that accompanied the development of a constitutional theory of
the freedom of religion guarantee, some light may be shed upon
the church-state relationship. Additionally, the problematical
application of a constitutional standard of a "wholesome sep-
aration of a concordant nature"4 will be explored.
II. Socmrx AND ET0a
As a general proposition, it may be stated at the outset that
citizenship is secular; that is, conceptually it may exist totally
disassociated from any consideration of religion. Where it is
assumed, however, that "[w]e are a religious people whose insti-
tutions presuppose a Supreme Being"5 it is readily apparent
that though citizenship may be secular, the citizen is not. More-
over, it may be assumed that every religious belief has a secular
3. Freedom of conscience may be separated into tvo component, yet inde-
pendent concepts. First, there exists the freedom of belief. Second, there is
conduct which may be an active or passive manifestation of belief characterized
by response. If the response is merely expression of opinion or proselyting of
a belief it is free from governmental restraint. But once carried beyond this
point, compelling interests of legitimate character may permit state regulation,
not of the belief but of the conduct.
4. Clark, Religion and the Law, 15 S.C.L. REv. 855 (1963).
5. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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extension, which manifests itself in social conduct, and is thus
brought within the scope of legislative control.
The affairs of society may be bisected into secular and relig-
ious divisions. If the citizen were singularly secular or singu-
larly religious there would perhaps be a clear line of demarca-
tion between the two. Beginning with extremes, it is simple
to point out the division between the church's interest in holy
days and the state's interest in good roads. These affairs are
distinct, but when the interests of each become common, such
as education and welfare, the line of demarcation vanishes, and
"the wall" becomes twisted and warped. The initial conclusion
is that there is not total separation of the affairs of church
and state.
The mere fact that a state regulation coincides with a religious
tenet does not make operative the proscription of the first
amendment. The phrase "secular legislative purpose" has come
to represent the test which any legislation suspect of violating
the first amendment must pass. However, aware of the osten-
sible duplication of church and state purposes, it is not sur-
prising to find a wide area of interaction between the two.
The more obvious example is the reappearance of parts
of the Decalogue in the civil Code. Thus, "[t]hou shalt not kill"6
becomes "[w]hoever is guilty of murder shall suffer the punish-
ment of death."17 This is reflective of the fact that western
thought, religious and secular, has produced a monolithic ethic,
to the extent that police power legislation is supported without
any consideration of origin.
III. DEvELOPmENT OF REmiGIOUS LIBERTY
The first amendment provides that Congress shall make .no
law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibit its free
exercise.8 Development of theoretical limitations of religious
and governmental interaction, within the limits of the pro-
hibition, however, has been less than sufficient. Clearly govern-
ment may not establish a national church; neither may it by
compulsion restrain the dictates of conscience or compel adop-
tion of a particular sect. Thus, as in the area of speech, gov-
ernment may not inhibit belief or mere opinion.
6. Exodus 20:13 (King James).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-52 (1962).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
Vol. 21
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In United States v. O'BiienP the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of § 462(b) (3) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, prohibiting the knowing destruction
of draft cards. Rejecting an argument premised on the existence
of symbolic speech, the Court said that when speech and non-
speech elements are combined, incidental limitations on free
speech freedom are permissible if there exists a legitimate state
interest in regulating the non-speech element.10 Utilizing the
"legitimate state interest" approach, it may likewise justify
incidental interaction with respect to religion. This is ques-
tionable, however, particularly in light of the sterile interpre-
tation placed upon the first amendment by the Court.1 ' This
interpretation is further complicated by the question of whether
an overly excessive separatist approach is in accord with the
concept of democracy.
That religious freedom has been used as a weapon to secure
a preferred place for sectarian as well as nonsectarian belief
is borne true by a review of the historical setting in which the
first amendment was fashioned. The early proponents of re-
ligious toleration, after escaping the persecution of minority
sects in England and on the European continent, upon reach-
ing this country strangely re-established support of churches
by public funds and enforced adherence to orthodox religious
9. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
10. Id. at 376-77.
11. But cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In a much cited
passage Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, said:
The constitutional inhibition on the subject of religion has a double
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious
organization or form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the
free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment
embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act.
The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot
be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to
preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case the
power to regulate must be exercised as not, in attaining a permis-
sible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.
Id. at 303-04.
A compelling state interest justifying infringement of the protected freedom
has been posited on the protection of democratic institutions, the welfare and
safety of the citizenry, and the right to promote public morals. Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437,
164 S.W.2d 972 (1942) ; see People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 889, 394 P.2d 813, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) ; People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
1969] NOTES
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beliefs. Anglicanism became the established religion in several
of the colonies, and gained a particular stronghold in Virginia.1-'
Those who sought to escape intolerance soon realized that the
singular religious-civil authority which they sought to escape,
had been replanted in America. Puritanism in New England
required that civil government's first responsibility be to sup-
port the "true religion."' 3 The unorthodox were denied equal
rights, taxes were levied to support the church and its clergy,
and compulsory worship in the "reformed Anglican church" was
enforced. 14
Pronouncement of freedom of conscience was slow in arriv-
ing, but by the advent of the American Revolution a move-
ment was established towards a separation of church and state.
Multiple establishment existed whereby several religious sects
were officially sanctioned; but while toleration increased, the
practice of financial and legal support to religious groups con-
tinued. The belief grew that government should guarantee
religious freedom to all persons, regardless of sect, with no
distinctions."' Although intolerance continued for a greater
period in the southern colonies than in the north,10 it was in Vir-
ginia that the seeds of religious freedom were first sown.
Toleration evolved into a recognition that freedom of conscience
is a natural right-an inherent right of the individual. Re-
ligious liberty, it was felt, could be achieved best under a system
of government which had no power to "interfere with the bene-
fits of any religious individual or group.' 7
Jefferson and James Madison were the most ardent propon-
ents of the struggle to establish freedom of religion. In 17 79
Jefferson wrote "An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom"
in which he proclaimed that civil rights were not dependent
on religious beliefs and
[t]hat no man shall be compelled to frequent or sup-
port any religious worship . . . nor shall otherwise
12. Butts, The American Tradition in Religion and Education in RELIGiON
AND Pouncs 11, 12 (P. Odegard ed. 1960).
13. Id. at 12.
14. Id. at 13.
15. Id. at 16.
16. C. PATTERSON, TE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINciPLEs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
180 (1953).
17. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947); see Corwin, The
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suffer an account of his religious opinions or belief;
but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argu-
ment to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion,
and that the same shall in nowise diminish, enlarge or
affect their civil capacities."'
The movement toward religious freedom reached a climax in
1781. A bill to establish a provision for teachers of the Chris-
tian religion was presented for reaffirmation in the Virginia
legislature. This influenced Madison to write "A Memorial and
Remonstrance on the Religious Rights of Man." Therein, he
vigorously espoused the belief that religion was outside the
cognizance of the state and he championed the "equal right of
every citizen to the free exercise of his religion, according to the
dictates of conscience." 19 In the Memorial and Remonstrance
Madison treated the Virginia bill as one of nondiscriminatory
support for all religion, yet condemned it as inconsistent with
the nature of religion; its effect being deleterious to both church
and state. Establishment of all religion, establishment of one
religion-both he believed in 1781 to be inconsistent with the
principle of religious liberty.
But in the constitutional debates when a bill, which eventual-
ly became reflected in the first amendment, was introduced
and debated, Madison, one of its proponents, made no reference
to aid to religion which had prompted his vigorous and suc-
cessful protest in the Virginia legislature. The draft merely
guaranteed that no religion be established by law, neither should
rights of conscience be infringed.2 0 In giving meaning to the
words, Madison said Congress could not establish a religion and
enforce legal observation of it by law; neither could Congress
compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their
conscience.
21
The language of the first amendment prohibits Congress
from making any law r'especting the establishment of eZligion.
The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the words to mean
18. Jefferson, An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom in RELIGION AND
POLITICS 18 (P. Odegard ed. 1960).
19. Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance on the Religious Rights of Man
in RE IGION AND PoLITIcs 22 (P. Odegard ed. 1960).
20. Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAw & ComNEmP. PnoB. 23, 42
(1949), quoting from III J. ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
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that Congress shall make no law respecting religion-respecting
meaning a favoring or disfavoring. Absent the criteria upon
which Madison conditioned his protest of the Virginia levy, as
clearly indicated by his interpretation of the proposed amend-
ment, it is difficult to reach the excessive tightening of the
amendment as understood by the Court. At least one eminent
authority asserts that the core of the amendment is prefer-
ence, and that legislation favorable to religion in general cannot,
without manifest falsification of history, be brought within the
prohibition of the language.2 2 Indeed, strenuous criticism has
been made of the first amendment, likening it to a weapon by
which those who profess no sectarian belief, but are avowed
nonbelievers, have secured a privileged place for no religion.
23
Additionally, although the religious majority may appear the
politically persuasive element, argument can be made for the
proposition that the first amendment has armed minority sects
to embattle the majority and gain a preferred status, thus vio-
lating the establishment clause in its pristine form-the pro-
hibiting of preference. It is here where the interplay of democ-
racy and individual liberties threaten each other. It is here
where the free exercise clause and the establishment clause
collide.
IV. Tm QUEST OF A MORE COMPREHENSIvE THEORY
A. Constitutional
The federal government is one of delegated powers. Within
the first amendment limitations it may neither give preference
to one religion nor effectuate compulsion of conscience as re-
spects its free exercise; the language prohibits nothing more.
Yet the Supreme Court has continually reaffirmed that the
language means more, rejecting unequivocally any assertion
that the establishment clause forbids only governmental pref-
erence of one religion over another. But by rejecting the con-
trary contention that the establishment clause prohibits merely
governmental preference as untenable and having only academic
22. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW &
CONTE P. PROB. 1, 20 (1949).
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value, the Court unconsciously subverts recognition of the fact
that constitutional law can change.24
The wooden interpretation given the establishment clause,
along with the inconsistent mechanistic application of the free
exercise clause, has not resulted in what the Court asserts to be
the fundamental principle of the first amendment-absolute
separation. If absolute separation is the sole constitutional
principle, by insulating church and state in respective spheres of
jurisdiction, the establishment clause, as presently interpreted,
is satisfied. But the no establishment language would be vir-
tually useless without incorporating the attendant free exer-
cise provision. Absolute separation as to both would not only
result in practical and theoretical difficulties, but would act
to restrain freedom of religion.25 Rather the dynamics of separa-
tion must be found in the precept of a single constitutional prin-
ciple encompassing the two clauses in order to achieve religious
liberty.
Separation and religious freedom are not mutually exclusive;
together they create a single precept of liberty. This concept
does not necessarily preclude governmental action to avoid re-
straints upon its free exercise, even though religion may inci-
dentally (as opposed to directly) be the standard for action.
Therefore, if free exercise is viewed as a means to attain re-
ligious liberty, until government acts partially the establish-
ment prohibition is not violated. By subordinating the estab-
lishment language within a single precept, leaving to its original
intendment that no one national religion be endowed with legal
privilege for its beliefs,2" positive protection of religious liberty
for religious and nonreligious sects may be enjoyed in an at-
mosphere of neutrality.
While there exists uncertainty as to what constitutes public
purpose and what is essentially a private purpose, the scope of
governmental action need not be so narrow as to preclude
legislation which has a primarily secular purpose, but which
incidentally affects religion. Theoretically law and religious
24. See -Pfeffer, Religion-Blind Government, 15 STAx. L. RIv. 389, 392
(1963) ; Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217 (1963).
25. See Meiklejohn, Educational Cooperation Between Church and State, 14
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 61, 68 (1949); Katz, Freedom of Religion and State
Neutrality, 20 U. CHr. L. REv. 426, 428 (1953).
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morality are severable, but to require that government be "re-
ligion-blind"27 would necessitate establishing an impractical
distinction that would result in hostility to both religious and
nonreligious sects.
B. FuwtionaZ
Functional application of a "secular legislative purpose test"
is devoid of precise definitional standards. First, public inter-
est and purpose relates only to the totality of legislation in
that it necessarily affects public purpose as a whole. Second,
public purpose has a resultant effect on private interests in that
legislation designed to serve exclusively public purpose is merely
a manifestation of singularly individual desires.
Bus transportation combined with a government initiated
program of tax reimbursement, seemingly secular, by logical
extension serves to satisfy private individual desires. Parents
have a private interest in the safety of their children; an
assurance that is provided by legislation grounded in the
scheme of comprehensive public purpose legislation. Likewise,
parents have a private interest in seeing that their children are
oriented religiously in adherence to their chosen religion, and
that they receive religious instruction compatible with their
beliefs. But the values of religious instruction, educationally, as
well as the private infusion of religious beliefs, are not solely
private.
28
While religious morality may be cleaved from the commands
of law in one sense, in the practical affairs of life there remains
a wide scope of the law which touches upon religious sensi-
bilities. Religious dogma may be singularly private, but the
infusion of spiritual morality is equally public as well as
private.
The Court has not utilized the two religion clauses in con-
junction, and while applying a purely secular purpose and pri-
mary effect test, supportive of separation respecting the estab-
lishment clause, interaction of legislative prohibitions and sec-
tarian interests apparently negates any requirement of separa-
tion necessary to effectuate the commands of the free exercise
27. See Pfeffer, Religion-Blind Government, 15 STA. L. Rzv. 389 (1963).
28. See Meiklejohn, Educational Cooperation Belween Church and State,
14 LAW & CONM AP. P~oB. 61, 68 (1949).
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clause. If legislative action is struck down as inhibiting or
coercing an individual's exercise of religious belief, the suggest-
ed effect is not neutrality but preferential recognition of relig-
ious activity in direct contravention of the establishment clause.
Given that there cannot be a standard for governmental
classification in terms of religion, a classification based on a
state interest divorced from primary religious considerations
supports a position of neutrality despite incidental effects it
may have upon religious activity. Case rationales, however, have
required that exemptions be carved out of enactments that may
incidentally affect religious belief, the strange result (one that
conflicts with the Court's conception of the establishment
clause) being that classifications based on sectarian beliefs are
permitted. Rather than utilizing complete separation, suppor-
tive of the establishment clause, and mechanical divisions and
exclusions that create a conflict between the establishment and
free exercise clauses, by positing impartial recognition of re-
ligious liberty on a concept of accomodating neutrality and
reading the two clauses in conjunction, government may act in
an even handed manner so as not to impose arbitrary classifica-
tions that violate religious freedom.
V. TB:E "IMPREGNABLE WALL" -A DIDACTIC EXPErIENCE
The constitutional principle of religious liberty is devoid of
any exacting precision unless the scope of the first amendment
is purposely intended to include separate constitutional prin-
ciples: (1) that there must be separation under the establish-
ment clause; and, (2) that there is no constitutional
requirement of separation under the free exercise clause.29 Thus,
discriminatory or nondiscriminatory financial aid is prohibited
by the establishment clause, but is permitted by the free exer-
cise clause if to deny such aid acts as a coercive force up on the
exercise of one's religious beliefs. While the majority of the
cases thus far litigated are judicially and constitutionally sound,
if adherence to a separatist precept is recognized, marked in-
consistencies appear where nondiscriminatory legislative classi-
fications, primarily secular, have been held constitutionally
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deficient for denying to individuals the benefits of state aid due
to an incidental conflict with a religious tenet.
Legislation passed under the banner of governmental author-
ity, consonant with the state's police power or those powers
delegated to the federal government, primarily secular in nature,
should not "permit individuals to be excused from compliance
with the law solely on the basis of religious beliefs."80 However,
government must be cognizant of religion, and to allow religious
liberty should be permitted, in a spirit of neutral accommoda-
tion, voluntarily to provide legislative relief to those individuals
whose religious beliefs would be seriously endangered by other-
wise constitutionally unassailable legislation. But to require that
sectarian exemptions be carved out under the prohibitive lan-
guage of the free exercise clause is not merely suspect of breach-
ing the wall. It is a clear departure from the intendment of the
language invoking state action as a means of aiding a particular
sect. Thus, it becomes patently clear that to achieve religious
liberty a position of stark neutrality may become an invitation
to the suppression of minority beliefs. Yet, a compelling state
interest that incidentally affects religious belief, having been
carried to a particular mode of conduct, is not destructive of
religious liberty.
A. Judiial Antipathy to Sectarian BeZlief
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies
solely between man and his God, that he owes account
to none other for his faith or his worship; that the
legislative powers of the Government reach actions
only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that acts of the whole American people which
declared that their Legislature should "make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of sep-
aration between Church and State.31
The adoption of Jefferson's language that the first amend-
ment builds a wall of separation between church and state first
occurred in Reynolds v. United States.82 Determining that re-
ligious belief may not justify the translation of that belief into
30. Kurland, Of Church and State and The Supreme Court, 29 U. CM. L.
REv. 1, 7 (1961).
31. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878) (emphasis added).
32. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
[Vol. 21
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action in contravention of a constitutionally permissible regula-
tory [criminal] statute, the Court adhered to the Jeffersonian
announced belief-action dichotomy. As an accepted doctrine of
the Morman Church it was the male's duty, circumstances per-
mitting, to practice polygamy, a practice violative of a federal
criminal statute.3 3 The Court upheld the prohibitory criminal
statute as a valid exercise concomitant with government's
power to regulate obligations springing from the contractual
marital relationship.3 4 The Court said that while government
could not interfere with religious belief, it was competent to
proscribe this particular action by legislation. 5
Additionally noteworthy is the fact that the Court, subsequent
to its determination that the statute was not constitutionally
infirm, refused to immunize those who entertained the religious
activity of polygamy from operation of the law on the basis of
religious belief. The statute, however, while based on a secular
purpose presupposing that "evil consequences" flowed from the
practice of polygamy, had an attendant incidental effect on the
free exercise of religious belief.
While the belief-action dichotomy has been criticized,30 it does
provide a basis for permitting governmental recognition of
religion. It does not, however, result in a divisive influence
prohibited by the terms of the first amendment. By applying
free speech criteria, the belief-action standard could function-
ally serve as a means to realize religious liberty while per-
mitting governmental interaction. Action standing alone must
be analyzed in light of its attendant results. Thus, proselyting
of religious belief would be without the scope of legislative in-
terference unless there exists a compelling state interest in regu-
lating particular modes of conduct such as dissemination of
religious material and seeking public solicitations.3 7 Conduct
33. Id. at 160.
34. Id. at 165.
35. Id. at 165-66.
36. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cnr. L.
REv. 1, 7 (1961). The author states that such a belief-action dichotomy is
incapable of aiding the resolution of difficult questions because a statute aimed
at prohibiting preaching [assumedly proselyting] by a particular sect, while
aimed at action violates the first amendment. But see Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; note 3 .rupra.
37. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). Although a claim of
religious immunity from statutory regulation of religious activity was set forth,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the selling of




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss3/5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REmW
historically without social approval could be similarly regulated
as a valid exercise of governmental police or public welfare
power.
In Davis v. Bason38 the Court upheld as a valid measure of
punitive legislation an Idaho statute requiring the swearing of
an oath, prerequisite to the exercise of the voting franchise, that
embodied antipathy to those religions requiring polygamous
practices. Rather than striking down the statute as one requir-
ing a religious test, prohibited by article VI of the Constitu-
tion,39 the Court subordinated the free exercise clause to crim-
inal sanctions-seemingly a valid exercise of governmental
authority. While basing its decision upon the Reynolds rationale
of a belief-action test, the distinction was misconstrued because
mere membership in a particular sect was deemed a sufficient
basis upon which to fix punitive legislation, absent action in
furtherance of a religious belief.40
State courts have similarly rejected claims of immunity based
on religious activities from governmental regulation. In Lawson
v. Oommonwea&tk 1 a conviction for violating an enactment
prohibiting the handling or use of snakes in religious rites
42
was sustained on the basis of the state's interest in securing the
lives, health, welfare and safety of its citizenry, including the
religious participants. Although snake handling was part of
the appellants' belief and practice, religious freedom was not
penalized by the state's interest in enacting nondiscriminatory
legislation limiting a particular mode of conduct. The statute,
38. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
39. U.S. CONsT. art. VI provides in part: "[N]o religious Test shall ever
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States."
40. Professor Kurland cites the case as being reflective of the enmity of the
Court Justices towards the Morman faith. Kurland, Of Church and State and
the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. R'v. 1, 10 (1961).
41. 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942).
42. The appellants were convicted of violating Ch. 60 of the 1940 Acts of the
Kentucky General Assembly, § 1267 a-i that provided:
No person shall display, handle or use any kind of snake or reptile
in connection with any religious service or gathering.
(a) Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor ....
The trial court refused to permit the reading of scriptural passages to the
jury upon which the appellants based their claim of immunization under the
cloak of religious activities. The purpose of handling snakes in religious cere-
monies was to demonstrate the participant's immunity through faith to the
possible fatal result of being bitten by a poisonous snake that would otherwise
occur if the immunity was not possessed.
[Vol. 21
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while it had incidental effects upon the exercise of a religious
belief, did not regulate the belief itself and was therefore not
an abridgment of the free exercise clause.43
In People v. Labrenz44 the parents of a child suffering from
an RH blood condition had refused, on account of religious
belief, to permit a transfusion of blood. The issue had been
mooted by prior appointment of a guardian who had author-
ized the blood transfusion, but the Illinois court dispensed with
procedural requirements that would have resulted in dismissal,
believing the case to be within that highly sensitive area in
which government action comes into direct contact with religious
beliefs.45 The court recognized that both freedom of religion
and the parental right to the care and training of children are
to be accorded the highest respect. Nevertheless, neither were
said to be beyond limitation,46 and the state could intervene to
safeguard its general interest in the well-being of its children.
47
B. Government Aid to Education-Everson v. Board of
Education: A Source of Clarity and Confusion
Direct and indirect aid under a government supported pro-
gram affecting sectarian institutions has been the subject of re-
current controversy. While direct aid to a particular sectarian
institution is clearly prohibited, a nondiscriminatory program of
aid may not be so clearly challenged as involving no public
purpose or being inconsistent with religious liberty. In Cochran
v. Louisiana State Board of Education48 the Court rejected a
challenge that no public purpose was involved in a state's ex-
penditure of funds to provide textbooks for pupils attending
private and parochial schools. Absent an attack based on the
establishment clause of the first amendment the Court said that
the legislation, designed to facilitate educational opportunity by
means of comprehensive legislation, clearly exhibited a public
43. A state may also limit the absolute right to proselyte religious views by
means of a carefully drawn nondiscriminatory statute regulating times, places
and manner without invading protected religious freedoms (and freedom of
speech likewise). See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
44. 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E2d 769 (1952).
45. Id. at 622, 104 N.E.2d at 772.
46. Id.
47. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Court said that
parents may make themselves martyrs, but not their children before they have
attained their majority and can decide for themselves. Id. at 170.
48. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
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purpose. Board of Education v. AllenP9 presented just such a
challenge. Therein, a New York program of lending textbooks
free of charge to all students, including those attending paro-
chial and private schools, was challenged as an exercise of
governmental power inconsistent with the prohibitive language
of the first amendment. Sustaining the legislation, the Court
viewed the program as being nonsectarian in furtherance of the
educational opportunities made available to children. Justice
White, writing for the majority, posited the decision on the
public purpose-private interest distinction utilized in Everson
v Board of Education.0 He reasoned that the law had a secular
legislative purpose of providing the benefits of a general pro-
grain of lending textbooks free of charge, and a primary effect
that neither advanced nor inhibited religion.5'
While state neutrality to religion and state aid to religion are
not marked by a clear line of division, in a concurring opinion
Justice Harlan envisioned a more simplistically adaptable
functional approach, devoid of any mechanical tests of inclu-
sion and exclusion, that allows religious liberty in an atmos-
phere of governmental neutrality. The rationale would be
where the contested governmental activity is calculated
to achieve nonreligious purposes within the competence
of the State, and where the activity does not involve the
State "so significantly and directly in the realm of the
sectarian as to give rise to . . .divisive influences and
inhibitions of freedom" it is not forbidden by the
religious clauses of the First Amendment.
5 2
Much of the recurrent controversy over aid to education has
at its core the language used by Justice Black in Everson v.
Board of Edueation."8 Therein, a statutory program of using
tax-raised funds to reimburse parents for bus transportation of
their children to public and parochial schools was challenged as
a use of state power inconsistent with the establisnent clause
of the first amendment and the New Jersey state constitution.
The Court sustained the program as being a proper exercise
of legislative power to implement a program of general public
49. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
50. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
51. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
52. Id. at 242 (concurring opinion).
53. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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welfare. The mere fact that a state law, passed to satisfy pub-
lic needs, coincided with the personal desires of those persons
most directly affected, provided no basis for denying to all
citizens, without regard to their religious belief, the benefits of
public welfare legislation.5
4
The challenges were framed in grounds supporting two pos-
sible avenues of attack. The argument was made that the pay-
ments constituted a taking of private property of some indivi-
duals by taxation and giving to others for their own private
purposes in contravention of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 55 As a second avenue of attack the statute
was challenged as an alleged use of state power to support
church schools."6 Justice Black disposed of the due process
challenge on the basis of Cochraz, stating that "[ilt is much too
late to argue that legislation intended to facilitate the oppor-
tunity of children to get a secular education serves no public
purpose.157 It is
no less true of legislation to reimburse needy parents
or all parents, for payment of the fares of their chil-
dren so that they can ride in public buses to and from
schools rather than run the risk of traffic and other
hazards incident to walking or hitchhiking .... ;
In disposing the establishment challenge the Court consid-
ered the New Jersey statute in light of what the estab-
lishment clause means. By way of dicta, Justice Black said, in
part, the clause means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up
a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religion8, or prefer one religion over another
.... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion....59
With this as a premise, it was reasoned that while New Jersey
could not, consistent with the first amendment, contribute tax-
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 7.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added). Although this is dictum in Everson, the
reasoning was later adopted in McCollum.
1969]
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raised funds to the support of a sectarian institution, likewise
it was prohibited from exhibiting hostility by hampering its
citizens in the exercise of their religon. The statute was geared
to confer benefits on all citizens without regard to religious
belief. To exclude persons of the Roman Catholic faith or any
person because of religious belief or disbelief, would have of
itself been violative of the first amendment. The first amend-
ment "requires [that] the state . . . be . . . neutral in its rela-
tions with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it
does not require the state to be their adversary."60
It has been suggested that perhaps the Court reached the
"outer limits of federal aid"6' 1 in Everson. However, in light of
Board of Education v. A7len a different conclusion is required.
In addition, there are numerous "aids" to religion in the vari-
ous levels of government that have not been the source of
litigous proceedings, although proponents of absolute separa-
tion have indicated the future may prove different.62
Of the numerous "aids", veterans receive benefits under the
"G.I." Bill, payments allowedly made by the federal govern-
ment to denominational institutions. There are provisions for
chaplains in the armed forces, and service academies have com-
pulsory chapel service. Additionally, religious organizations
enjoy specific exemptions from the burden of federal income
tax, and invocational prayers are read in state and federal
houses of government. However, these are merely illustrative of
the fact that the first amendment requires neutral accommoda-
tion rather than hostility towards or no recognition of religion.63
Proponents of aid, state or federally granted, however, must
remain concerned in light of the statement in Eversont that
neither the federal nor the state government may pass laws
that "aid one religion, aid all religions.1 64 Those encouraging
60. Id. at 18.
61. Note, Federal Aid to Church Affiliated Colleges and Universities:
Breaching the "Wall," 19 S.C.L. REv. 231, 235 (1967).
62. T mE, March 14, 1968, at 31. One opponent, Madalyn Murry O'hair,
alleging to be as she put it "the leader of a valid movement," said: "I will
separate church and state, by God."
63. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 n.1 (1962) (concurring opinion),
citing FELDMAN, THE LInITS oF FREnom 40-41 (1959).
64. 330 U.S. at 15.
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federal aid originally found succor in Bradfield v. Roberts,"5
the first case based on the establishment clause decided by the
Court. Similarly, state proponents of aid have advanced the
Cochran rationale and will now have Allen for additional sup-
port, although the Court was divided, particularly over the in-
tendment of Everson.
Were it not for the holding in Everson, the question of gov-
ernment supported financial aid would be a closed issue. How-
ever, the ever increasing hue and cry for government authored
financial aid will test the ingenuity of legislative architects to
couch programs in terms of purely public welfare legislation.
Seemingly, a statute is constitutional if it is germane to and
framed so as to accord public need, not representative of a
classification in terms of religion, and is regulated permissibly
within the scope of a specifically delegated federal power, or
the state's general police powers. Moreover, there will be no
violation of the religion clauses whether they are read indivi-
dually as a separation clause and a freedom clause, or together
to create a single precept of religious liberty. Legislation, parti-
cularly in the field of education, might also be deemed valid
even though it can be said to benefit discriminatorily certain
religious groups, if there exists no alternative method of effec-
tuating educational policies. This may be so although the appli-
65. 175 U.S. 291 (1899). The Court sustained federal aid appropriated for
the construction of a public ward to be a part of a hospital, incorporated in the
District of Columbia under a Congressional act of incorporation, and operated
by Sisters of the Roman Catholic Church. Bradfield, a taxpayer, seeking to
restrain the payment of moneys by the Secretary of the Treasury, premised
his challenge on an erroneous construction of the establishment clause. The
challenge alleged that the appropriation was "respecting religious establish-
ment." The Court pointed out that such phrase was not synonymous with the
first amendment phrase "respecting [an] establishment of religion" and said
that merely because the hospital was administered by Roman Catholics, re-
ligious influence cannot convert a corporation, secular as constituted by its act
of incorporation, into a sectarian body. Legal powers and duties are determined
by reference to the act of incorporation, and the purpose of the corporation
was to provide a hospital in the District of Columbia for the care of persons
placing themselves under the care and treatment of that corporation. See Quick
Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
Interestingly, in Bradfield, the standing of the taxpayer, as to whether there
existed a justiciable controversy as required by article III, § 2 of the Constitu-
tion with regard to any question of establishment, was of no consequence in
the eyes of the Court. In light of Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923),
plaintiff taxpayers could not in their individual capacity as a federal taxpayer
satisfy the requirement of standing, their interest being too minute or inde-
terminate. However, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), while not specifically
overruling Frothingham, indicates that a federal taxpayer does have standing
if he can point to the abridgment of a specific constitutional guarantee.
1969] NoT
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cation of the statute has an attendant incidental effect upon
individuals who profess no religious belief. While to make
accommodation between a religious action and an exercise of
governmental authority is an extremely delicate task,(6 if there
exists a primary secular purpose such as educational opportunity,
and no applicable alternative, there must be a necessary accom-
modation. 7
C. The Released Time Programs: The "Soft Euphemism
of Co-operation"
A state may not consistent with the first and fourteenth
amendments provide direct financial aid to a particular denom-
inated sectarian group nor enact legislation utilizing religion
as a basis for classification. 8 Does the first amendment, how-
ever, preclude a program of co-operation with religious groups
by tax supported public school systems?
In McCollum v. Board of Educatio0 9 an Illinois "released
time program" conducted under the auspices of a tax supported
public school system was struck down as being a "utilization
of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system
to aid religious groups to spread their faith"70 falling squarely
66. Resolution in favor of the government results in the choice to the indi-
vidual affected thereby of either abandoning his religious principle or facing
criminal prosecution. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961). But
"[t]o strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes
only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does
not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the
operating latitude of the legislature." Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
67. "[I]f the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals,
the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless
the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose Such a
burden . . . " Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
68. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
69. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
70. Id. at 210. While the Court framed the purpose of the first amendment,
based on Everson, upon terms that both religion and government best achieve
their goals if each is left free to exercise authority in its own sphere, that
sectarian groups were significantly aided in spreading their faith should have
been clarified. Proselyting was not an independent consideration in and of
itself. Indeed, proselyting is specifically protected, although more specifically
within the umbrella of free speech. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In Murdock
the Court held that the "spreading [of] one's religious beliefs or preaching the
Gospel through distribution of religious literature and through personal visita-
tions is an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional
protection as the more orthodox types." 319 U.S. at 110. Rather, merely teach-
ing of religious views was involved in McCollum, the students participating
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within the prohibition of the first amendment as interpreted
in Everson. But in Zoraoh v. C/auson,71 a decision handed down
four years later, the Court sustained a New York "released time
program", distinguishing it from McColum on the fact that the
children excused for the purposes of religious instruction at-
tended the instructional classes off the public school premises
and there was no expenditure of public funds in aid of reli-
gion.
72
A comparison of the rationales of the released time program
of Zoracl and MoColbum reveals that the Supreme Court's
distinction may have been unwarranted. Both operated by
means of state machinery of compulsory education, facilitating
the parental desire of having religious instruction provided for
their children. While the pupil was being brought into school
by statutorily provided compulsory education laws, the school
would release the student from secular education, conditioned
upon the student's using that time released to him for sectarian
religious instruction. Each program was a "conscientious at-
tempt to accommodate the allowable functions of Government
and the special concerns of the Church." 73 While the determin-
ation of a coercive element was vital to the MoColum decision,
the nonrecognition of coercion was equally vital to validation
of the program in Zorach, despite the infusion of New York's
already having been committed to a particular faith by parental "coercion",
and the use of tax-supported institutions in furtherance of instruction.
The appellant in McCollum offered in support of the position asserted, the
case of Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910). Therein a
writ of mandamus was sought to compel discontinuance of Bible reading (King
James version; Roman Catholics used the Douay version), singing of religious
hymns, and recitation of the Lord's Prayer. The court said that one of the
purposes of the state constitution was to protect minority groups against the
compulsory wishes of the majority.
71. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
72. Illinois had a compulsory education law providing punitive misdemeanant
status for violation. Under the program religious instructors, employed at no
cost to the public school system, yet subject to approval and supervision by
school authorities, conducted religious instructional classes in the classrooms
of the public schools. Pupils receiving parental permission were released for
specified periods of time from secular classroom duties to receive religious
training. Those students who chose not to take the religious instruction were
required to leave their classrooms and pursue their secular studies elsewhere
in the school building, but were not released from school duties. Those stu-
dents having obtained parental consent were required to be present at the
religious class. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
The New York City program was conducted in the same fashion as that in
McCollum except that the religious instruction or devotional exercises were
conducted off the public school premises.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss3/5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviEw
compulsory education law into the substitution of secular edu-
cational activity for sectarian religious instruction. Thus, each
program laid bare evidenced as the pith of their mechanics, that
without state accommodation and school co-operation neither
program would have succeeded.
The impregnable wall, masoned higher in McCollum, requir-
ing public education to be singularly secular, was successfully
breached in Zorach. Or was there merely a gate? If individual
interests are aided only as the common interest is safeguarded, 74
can there be an accommodation of state and nondivisive secta-
rian influence, without resultant practical.difficulty? Decisions
turn on how the church and state may be kept apart. It is sug-
gested that practice should dictate that, being "a religious
people", determinations should seek to resolve how sects, reli-
gious and nonreligious, can work together with government to
promote the general welfare ;75 and yet leave government and re-
ligion free to act in their respective spheres.76
D. ReZigion-An Unwelcome Teacher?
There is no better place to develop religion than in the
home, at the church and in the Sunday School. In my
day it was the job of the parents and the preachers and
Sunday School teachers to inculcate and develop a re-
ligious atmosphere among children. What we need is
more people doing this and fewer passing the buck on
to the public schools. One fledgling prayer leader in
74. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930).
75. Meiklejohn, Educational Cooperation Between Church and State, 14
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 61, 71 (1949).
76. The state, by enacting compulsory education laws, may act as a coercive
force in derogation of the parental right to guide the education of their chil-
dren. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). By removing the
child from parental protection can it be gainsaid that the state may not, acting
as parens patriae, attempt to provide, with parental consent, further instillment
of moral fiber in the child as part of the educational processes, in keeping with
the dynamics of religious liberty through free exercise. This by no means
would be in derogation of the belief that "if mankind were left in the quiet
possession of their unalienable religious privileges, . . . [religion] . . . would
... flourish . .. by its own native excellence, and under the all-disposing
providence of God." HOWE, CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 5 (1952) cited in Clark, Religion and the Law, 15 S.C.L. Ray. 855, 866
(1963). Rather it would be an accommodation of state and church, generated
by state non-religious purposes [the fulfillment of parental responsibility], and
not involve the state so significantly as to give rise to divisive sectarian influ-
ences. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968).
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the home is worth a dozen parroters in the school-
house.7
7
Specifically embraced within the concept of liberty, as found
in the fourteenth amendment, is the parental right to guide the
educational processes of their children. s Yet, once having
exercised the initial selective right to send their children to a
public or a sectarian school, the word "liberty" does not include
the right to seek state accommodation to religious belief by
means of official sponsorship of a religious exercise. The state,
acting as a coercive force,79 may not permissibly become so
directly involved in sectarian purposes that the first amend-
ment is violated.
While moral considerations are within state competence, is
morality capable of severance from religious overtones so as to
be without state cognizance?. A distinction, not indicated by
case decision, exists between state accommodation of religion and
prayer. Religion, while a manifestation of individual desire,
is of public concern; yet prayer is between man and God, and
needs no intermediary-the state. Thus, state intrusion in the
exercise of prayer exerts a coercive force, violating one's right
of free exercise.
In EngeZ v. Vitale80 a state composed prayer8' to be read aloud
at the beginning of the school day was attacked by the parents
of ten children as being in violation of the establishment clause.
8 2
Although participation in the denominationally neutral program
77. Clark, Religion and the Law, 15 S.C.L. Rav. 855, 866 (1963).
78. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
79. The fact that the state is the only coercive force raises the question
whether the distinction between the establishment clause and the free exercise
clause, the latter predicated on the existence of coercion while the former is
absent such, is indeed valid. More pointedly, a state law enacted so as to pro-
vide compulsory prayer or Bible reading would involve a question of free
exercise of religion, the individual affected being prohibited from freely exer-
cising his religious or nonreligious beliefs. While such an interpretation might
seemingly reduce substantially the proposition that the two clauses are co-equal
in that each guarantees religious liberty, the case decisions have conversely
subordinated the free exercise clause to the establishment clause, in contraven-
tion of the intent of the framers.
80. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
81. The prayer was: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
Country." Id. at 422.
82. The New York Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's upholding
of the prayer's use on the basis that no pupil was required to recite the prayer
over his own or his parents' objections.
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was on a voluntary basis,8 3 the prayer was deemed an establish-
ment of religion, impermissibly uniting government and religion
in contravention of the first amendment.
Interestingly was the conflict as expressed by Justice Douglas,
concurring, with the earlier decision in Everson.
My problem today would be uncomplicated but for
[Everson] .... The Everson case seems in retrospect
to be out of line with the First Amendment. Its result
is appealing, as it allows aid to be given to needy
children.
84
Yet, Engel was not out of line with the Everson rationale.
The prayer was not representative of a permissible accommoda-
tion of state and religion by releasing students to receive re-
ligious instruction outside the school facilities, compatible with
their beliefs. Neither was it representative of legislation de-
signed as part of a program of general welfare that incidentally
satisfied private interests as well as a public purpose. It was not
a law where government sought to achieve nonreligious purposes,
yet concurrently affecting religious sensibilities. Rather it was a
studious attempt incisively to introduce a program incompatible
with the concept of religious liberty. The mere realization of
religious liberty and neutral accommodation was absent; in its
place was direct state involvement that was calculated singularly
to achieve a religious purpose.
One year later, in Abington School Distict v. Schempp, 5 the
Court held that the first amendment prohibits the selection and
83. The nondenominational character of the prayer coupled with voluntary
observance was said not to free the prayer from the limitations of the estab-
lishment clause as it might from the free exercise clause. Justice Black, writing
for the Court, characterized the difference between the two clauses, stating the
establishment clause need not require a showing of direct governmental com-
pulsion; yet when prestige of government is placed behind a religious belief,
the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to an offi-
cially approved plan is clear.
Inferentially, at least, there seems to be no difference. The coercive element
is present, be it direct or indirect. Rather than considering this to be an estab-
lishment, because no preference is indicated as to a particular religious belief,
it is suggested that the case decision could have been posited on the free
exercise clause.
84. 370 U.S. at 443. Compare Justice Douglas' statement with Justice Bren-
nan's concurrence in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
wherein he stated: "The Framers were not concerned with the effects of cer-
tain incidental aids to individual worshippers which come about as by-products
of general and nondiscriminatory welfare programs." Id. at 302.
85. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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reading of verses from the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's
Prayer at the beginning of the school day by pupils. The first
amendment, containing the words "respecting an establishment
of religion," has been interpreted to prohibit state programs that
are religious "exercises." Thus, the establishment language, the
intendment of the framers as concerned preference, has been
equated by interpretation to mean a religious exercise. It is
through this interpretation placed upon the first amendment that
the Court has ultimately concluded that any notions of mere
preference have been unequivocally rejected."6 Further, by case
decision the establishment clause has foreclosed state legislation
respecting sectarian belief, making public education the "em-
bodiment" of the wall of separation.
8 7
The Congressional response to the Engel and Scherpp cases
was mixed. In 1964: numerous constitutional amendments were
proposed. Representative Becker, a New York congressman,
appeared before the House Judiciary Committee for the pur-
pose of speaking in favor of an amendment for the allowance
of prayer and biblical recitation in public schools and other
public places. The resolution offered was designed to make it
constitutional to refer to and rely upon God in all matters re-
lated to our existence as a nation.8 8 However, President Ken-
nedy, speaking of the decision in Engle, proffered that parents
should, as a result, intensify their efforts at home, making the
home a more accommodating place to recite prayer.89
E. Free Exeroise-No Reguirement of Separation?
The Court, in applying the secular purpose and effect test in
support of the separation it deems required by the establish-
ment clause, has conversely negated any requirement of separa-
tion to achieve religious liberty as respects the free exercise
language. Thus, while the state may not by legislative efforts
or state coerced action seek to unite religion and government in
a manner that raises divisive influences, likewise it must predi-
86. Id. at 217.
87. Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAw & CoNTEmP. PRoB. 23, 37
(1949).
88. 11 members of the House introduced bills substantially consistent with
H.J. Res. 693 (the Becker Amendment) to amend the constitution, and 58
members introduced identical resolutions. The Becker Amendment was the
most widely discussed proposal. H.J. Res. 693, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
89. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1962, at 12, cited in 2 THE CoxSTiTUTnoN AND THE
SuPPJmc COURT-A DOCUMENTARY HisTORy 93 (L. Pollak ed. 1968).
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cate action so as not to invade liberties protected under the
fourteenth amendment. While recognition was given to relevant
political and societal concerns,90 certain subjects were to be
withdrawn "from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities."9 1 The wall of separ-
ation, whatever its shape and form as relates to the establish-
ment problem, creates practical difficulties when assimilation
into the free exercise language is attempted.
A law that clearly and markedly renders benefits to a parti-
cular religion, more properly burdens the free exercise of re-
ligion of other religious groups and inhibits those possessing
nonreligious beliefs, rather than being an establishment. Under
the establishment language it might be said that, incorporating
preferential treatment as a test, there can be no compelling
state interest that permits governmental intrusion into the re-
ligious order. Yet, under the free exercise language a compelling
state interest, as indicated earlier in Reynolds, can override any
religious conduct. The crucial distinction then becomes re-
ligious conduct as apart from manifestation of religious belief.
The power of the state to act, however, in regulating conduct
must not be exercised so as to burden impermissibly the exercise
of religious liberty.
92
When religious belief is burdened by state legislation and
there exists no form of conduct prompted by religious prin-
ciples, absent incidental burden in effectuating a compelling
state interest, the legislation is a subject which the state may
regulate without violating the first amendment. But in iBherlert
V. Vern ,93 wherein a Seventh Day Adventist was disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits because she would not
work on Saturday, her faith's Sabbath Day, the Court found
that the legislation imposed an impermissible burden on the
exercise of her religion and was not justified as a compelling
interest of the state. In determining what constitutes a com-
pelling state interest the Court said a rational relationship was
insufficient; "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."94 The result
90. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940).
91. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
92. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
93. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
94. Id. at 406.
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of the statute was to force a choice between the precepts of re-
ligious belief or the nonreceipt of unemployment benefits.95
S]erbert resulted in positive protection of religious liberty,
representing the permissible neutral accommodation of govern-
ment and religion. To require that government not be cognizant
of religion would have the effect of cleaving law and religion,
and a state acting pursuant to majority desires could effectively
stifle minority religious belief.
VI. CoNcLusIoN
The inquiry, focused upon the existence and practicality of
recognizing that there is a wall of separation between church
and state, if not merely an academic exercise, may merely be a
reflection of antiquarian concepts. Yet, constitutional standards
require some degree of clarity, particularly in the area of re-
ligion. This is not merely so for the benefit of informing gov-
ernment what it cannot permissibly do, if there be any effect
upon religious sensibilities. Government need be informed what
it may achieve without running afoul of the first amendment.
While there will be attendant difficulties, a working balance
which would include those not subscribing to a religious be-
lief, as well as those adhering to particular religious principles,
need be considered.
Thus, religious liberty is postulated as the principle of the
first amendment, not stark separation. Mechanical application
of a slogan, "a wall of separation," will not achieve what the
framers perceived to be the real intendment of the first amend-
ment. Utilizing the dynamics of separation as but a means of
achieving religious freedom, coupled with allowance of a state
to act so as to achieve a public secular purpose, although inci-
dentally a mere extension of private desires, despite permissible
incidental effects upon religion will seek to accommodate the
principles of a democratic society and the principle of religious
liberty as expressed in the language of the first amendment.
JAms G. Born
95. Id. at 404. The Court specifically negated the idea that it was fostering
the establishment of a religion. The Court stated that it only held that a state
"may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions [of unemployment
benefits] so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions
respecting the day of rest." Id. at 410 (emphasis added). Compare this lan-
guage with the Court's opinion in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
and the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart and the dissenting opinion of
Justice Harlan in Sherbert.
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